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ABSTRACT 
AN EVALUATION ON CURRENT ISLAMIC FINANCE AND BANKING 
By 
Aliasghar Arabi 
 
In the recent decade, the Islamic financial system has experienced remarkable growth 
and transformation, demonstrating its potential as a competitive form of financial 
intermediation. In developing the Islamic financial system, it is important to focus on 
the appropriate pre-requisites that will facilitate its efficient evolution. Fundamental to 
this is the development of the institutions, the markets, the range of financial products 
and services and having in place the accounting, legal, regulatory, supervisory and 
Shariah frameworks, as well as, for the monetary authority to have the capacity to 
manage its financial policies within this context.  
In Islamic banking, the management of risks becomes more challenging due to its 
peculiar risk characteristics and the requirement for compliance to Shariah principles. 
An Arabic word for Islamic law, Shariah governs both secular and religious life of 
devout Muslims. It covers religious rituals and many aspects of day-to-day living, 
politics, economics, banking, and law. 
Another facet to risk management is the need for the Islamic banking industry to 
develop a derivatives market. In addition, it also needs deeper and more efficient 
money and capital markets to facilitate sound asset and liability, and liquidity 
management by Islamic financial institutions. 
The development of a vibrant Islamic finance and banking sector cannot be achieved 
without the support of appropriate human capital development and strengthening of 
research and intellectual capacity in the sphere of finance and Shariah. The Islamic 
banking industry needs to be equipped with a new breed of innovators, risk managers, 
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regulators and supervisors who have the right blend of knowledge of finance and the 
understanding of the Shariah. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A central tenet of an economic system based on Islamic principles is the absolute 
prohibition on the payment and receipt of interest. It is this prohibition that makes 
Islamic banks and financial institutions differ in a fundamental sense from their 
Western counterparts. As the use of the interest rate in financial transactions is 
precluded, Islamic banks are expected to conduct operations only on the basis of 
profit-sharing arrangements or other modes of financing permissible under Islamic 
law. At present, some 300 Islamic Financial Institutions (IFI) are operating in 75 
countries, mostly concentrated in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and have some 
type of Islamic banking or financial institutions.1 This development, which has gained 
momentum since the second half of the 1970s, has basically taken two forms. The 
first has been an attempt to establish Islamic financial institutions side by side with 
traditional banking. In such attempts, two types of institutions have evolved: Islamic 
banks, established mostly in Muslim countries, and Islamic investment and holding 
companies, operating in some Muslim but mostly in non-Muslim countries. In both 
cases, generally, the banking operations of Islamic banks are subject to specific 
regulations that apply to all banks. These institutions compete with conventional 
banks to attract deposits-but without paying a predetermined interest rate-and invest 
these funds wherever they find profitable investment opportunities. The majority of 
these institutions were established through private initiatives.  
The paper has been divided into 6 sections. Section 1 is introduction. Section 2 looks 
into the Past and Present of Islamic Finance and Banking. Section 3 of the paper 
provides an overview of the Islamic financial ethics. Section 4 deals with 
                                                 
1 Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
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Characteristics of Islamic Finance and Banking. Section 5 presents Future Challenges 
for Islamic Finance and Banking. Finally last section provides a brief conclusion of 
the paper. Appendix investigates Islamic financial system in Iran. 
2. Past and Present of Islamic Finance and Banking 
2.1. History of Islamic Finance and Banking 
Local Islamic banks formed in the 1970s in Muslim countries such as Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Dubai and originally emphasized joint-venture structures akin to private 
equity. They quickly evolved to provide short-term credit facilities by using the 
murâbaha structure. With increase in scale, Islamic banks began to branch out to 
more complex financing schemes, such as retail banking, including, deposit taking 
and consumer lending and Bonds (sukûk) and Medium- and Long-term leases (ijâra) 
Impact of 9/11 led to Reverse Capital Flight. Perception of hostile climate in many 
Western jurisdictions, in particular, the United States, led to repatriation of dollars by 
Arab investors to Middle Eastern banks. Islamic banks, along with conventional 
banks in the region, benefited from this reverse flight of capital. Moreover, increase in 
oil prices led to dramatic increase in liquidity in the Gulf. Later, Conventional Banks 
Open “Islamic Windows” and began to respond to requests from Muslim clients to 
offer products that complied with Islamic law. As the size of the potential market 
became clear, conventional banks responded with the creation of divisions dedicated 
to Islamic banking. Some of Conventional International Banks with Islamic Windows 
are such as Citigroup, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, UBS, ABN AMRO, Standard 
Chartered Bank.  Almost all regional banks have followed the international banks in 
creating “Islamic” windows and some have converted, or are in the process of 
converting, to the Islamic banking model.2 
                                                 
2 See " Munawar Iqbal and Philip Molyneux (2005)" 
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2.2. Recent Trends 
The recent phenomenal growth of Islamic banking underpinned the need for greater 
innovation and flexibility to facilitate wider acceptance of Islamic products and 
services. Table 1 presents an estimate of the global Islamic industry. 
Table 1: Estimate of Global Islamic Industry 
Number of Islamic financial institutions 275 
Countries of presence  75 
Asset holding size US$280bn 
Financial investments US$400bn 
Growth in last five years 15% 
    Source: IMF Research, Monetary and capital Market Department 
Islamic banking customers are not only confined to limited areas such as the Middle 
East but are spreading across Europe, the US and Asia Pacific. The global Muslim 
population is approximately 1.6 billion and Islam is considered to be the fastest-
growing religion in the world. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that 
global financial institutions are creating a range of Islamic investment instruments. 
The industry has embraced a wide range of institutions and products, including 
commercial Islamic banks, Islamic investment companies, Islamic investment banks, 
insurance companies, asset management companies, e-commerce, brokers and 
dealers. Products include commercial Islamic banking products, insurance products, 
mutual funds and unit trusts, Islamic bonds and Shari'a compliant stocks. It has been 
over two decades since Islamic banks first appeared as active players and today 
Islamic banking and finance has become a force to be reckoned with. The provision of 
banking services adhering to Shari'a rules has grown to such an extent that many 
conventional banks, both in the Middle East and in the US and Europe, have realized 
that it is a segment that demands their attention. 
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In September 2003, the General Council of Islamic Banks reported that assets in the 
global Islamic banking and finance (IBF) industry exceeded US$250bn and were 
growing at an annual rate of about 23.5%. Over the previous decade, annual IBF 
growth averaged about 10%. At US$280bn, the market is still small, but the 
addressable market is huge. 
There is a spread of Islamic banking outside the Middle East and the Gulf countries. 
Singapore, for example, already manages around US$2bn of Shari'a compliant capital 
market funds and is seeking to grow rapidly over the next few years, particularly in 
the fields of wealth management, capital markets and reinsurance within the Islamic 
banking sector. Malaysia is also a strong player. Islamic banking has figured here for 
23 years. Its share of the total market for Shari'a products has now reached around 
12%. With strong support from its government, it is slowly creeping up year on year 
and is currently worth in the region of £10.7bn (British pound). And by sheer force of 
numbers, the Republic of Indonesia is still the most populous Muslim-majority nation 
in the world, with almost 86% of Indonesians declared Muslim according to the 
country's 2000 census. Its total population in July 2006 was more than 245 million.3 
2.3. Growth and Business Development 
The Muslim population accounts for nearly one quarter of the world's population, and 
it is expected to grow at a faster rate. With demand for Islamic products rising, the 
availability of Shari'a-compliant banking, investment, and insurance products 
continues to grow. 
The industry faces competition from a number of angles, not least from the 
conventional financial sector. Well established, western-based global financial players 
                                                 
3   Source : International Banking System Report 
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continue to open and expand operations in Muslim regions of the world and have built 
infrastructures to enter markets, particularly in the Islamic financial centers of Dubai, 
Bahrain, and Kuala Lumpur. They are using their considerable operational, marketing, 
and technology skills to produce and distribute Islamic financial products in direct 
competition with indigenous financial institutions. 
Today, more than 250 Islamic banks (90 institutions of them are in the Middle East) 
are operating from China to the US. Western banks, through their Islamic units in the 
UK, Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and others countries also practice Islamic 
banking. 
Pure-play Islamic banks and financial institutions manage over US$280bn in assets 
and a further US$200-300bn is managed by the Islamic windows and subsidiaries of 
international banks. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region has been a hotbed 
of activity as far as the Islamic banking industry is concerned, where 41 Islamic 
financial institutions are currently operating in the GCC countries (of which 18 are 
banks). Qatar and Bahrain are the leaders and hold a 70% share of the assets, while 
the UAE accounts for 19% of assets. The growth in assets is estimated at 15% and 
expected to remain so, for several reasons such as growth in overall wealth in the 
Middle East, growing awareness about the Islamic products, wider availability and 
variety of Islamic financial products and because equity/asset ratio of Islamic banks 
stands at 13.1% compared to 11.3% for conventional banks in the GCC region. This 
indicates under-utilization of capital and provides a lot of scope for taking on 
additional risk on the balance sheet.4 
                                                 
4 IBF review, July-Sep 2007 
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3. Islamic Financial Ethics 
Islamic scholars have undertaken a thorough examination of relevant verses from the 
holy Quran and the Sunnah and have long established the basic principles, which 
govern the rights and obligations of participants in the financial markets. I present 
below some important norms of Islamic ethics as are applicable to financial markets. 
All these norms may form the basis of regulation and legislation relating to financial 
markets.5 
3.1. Freedom to Contract 
Islam provides a basic freedom to enter into transactions. The holy Quran says: Allah 
has made trade lawful. (2:275). Further, no contract is valid if it involves an element 
of coercion for either of the parties. The holy Quran also says: let there be among you 
traffic and trade by mutual goodwill (4:29). However, this basic norm does not imply 
unbridled freedom to contract and may be sacrificed when there is a trade-off with 
other norms requiring specific injunctions. 
3.2. Freedom from Al Riba (Excess or Interest) 
All forms of contracts and transactions must be free from riba. This implies that there 
is no reward for time preference and under conditions of zero risk. The question of 
riba has been addressed in a large body of literature and there is a general consensus 
about the meaning and implications of riba. (Explained in detail in coming sections) 
3.3. Freedom from Al Gharar (Excessive Uncertainty) 
All forms of contracts and transactions must be free from excessive gharar. This 
implies that contracting under conditions of excessive uncertainty is not permissible. 
Islamic scholars have identified the conditions and highlighted situations that involve 
excessive uncertainty and consequently, disallow a contract.  
                                                 
5 See " Kamali, M. Hashim (1999) 
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3.4. Freedom from Al-Qimar (gambling) and Al-Maysir (Unearned Income) 
Contracting under excessive uncertainty or gharar is akin to gambling (al-qimar). And 
uninformed speculation in its worst form is also akin to gambling (al-qimar). The 
holy Quran and the traditions of the holy prophet explicitly prohibit gains made from 
games of chance which involve unearned income (al-maysir). Here it may be noted 
that the term speculation has different connotations. It always involves an attempt to 
predict the future outcome of an event. But the process may or may not be backed by 
collection, analysis and interpretation of relevant information. The former case is very 
much in conformity with Islamic rationality. An Islamic economic unit is required to 
assume risk after making a proper assessment of risk with the help of information. All 
business decisions involve speculation in this sense. It is only the gross absence of 
value-relevant information or conditions of excessive uncertainty that makes 
speculation akin to a game of chance and hence, forbidden. 
3.5 Freedom from Price Control and Manipulation 
Islam envisages a free market where prices are determined by forces of demand and 
supply. There should be no interference in the price formation process even by the 
regulators. It may be noted here that while price control and fixation is generally 
accepted as unIslamic, some scholars, such as, admit of its permissibility. Such 
permissibility is subject to the condition that price fixation is intended to combat cases 
of market anomalies caused by impairing the conditions of free competition. It is a 
requirement that the forces of demand and supply should be genuine and free from 
any artificial element. Islam therefore, condemns any attempts to influence prices 
through creating artificial shortage of supply (ihtikar). Similarly, any attempt to bid 
up the prices by creating artificial demand is considered unethical. Such an action of 
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bidding up the price without an intention to take delivery is termed as najas and is not 
permissible. 
3.6 Entitlement to Transact at Fair Prices 
Prices that are an outcome of free play of forces of demand and supply without any 
intervention or manipulation are believed to be fair. However, in some instances, 
pricing is based on a valuation exercise. In such cases the difference between the price 
at which a transaction is executed and the fair price (as per the opinion of valuation 
experts) is termed as ghubn. The presence of ghubn makes a transaction unethical. 
3.7 Entitlement to Equal, Adequate and Accurate Information 
Islam attaches great importance to the role of information in the market. Release of 
inaccurate information is forbidden. The concealment of vital information (ghish) also 
violates the norms of Islamic ethics and according to the traditions of the holy 
prophet; the informationally disadvantaged party at the time of the entering into the 
contract has the option to annul the contract. The traditions refer to price information 
in the market as well as other information relevant for valuation of the commodity. 
Islamic scholars are of the opinion that a transaction must be free from jahalah or 
misrepresentation to be considered Islamic. The institution of a transparent market is, 
thus, quite important and transactions should be executed within the market after 
taking into account all relevant information. It may be noted that the holy traditions 
that deal with the issue, refer to a commodity transaction. In case of a commodity 
transaction, the commodity in question is subject to inspection and both the parties 
can be reasonably sure about the benefits that are going to flow from future 
possession of the commodity. Unlike a commodity, however, the benefits from a 
project are in the form of expected cash flows. These expected cash flows are also 
subject to continuous revision as new events occur. Hence, Islamic ethics requires that 
9 
 
all information relevant to expected cash flows and asset valuation should be equally 
accessible to all investors in the market.6 
3.8. Freedom from Darar (Detriment) 
This refers to the possibility of a third party being adversely affected by a contract 
between two parties. If a contract between two parties executed with their mutual 
consent is detrimental to the interests of a third party, then it may enjoy certain rights 
and options.  
The list of norms of Islamic ethics stated above is by no means exhaustive. It differs 
from the norms of mainstream financial ethics significantly - in imposing injunctions 
against al-riba, al-qimar, and al-maysir. 
The next important question is how to prioritize various norms of Islamic financial 
ethics when there is a possible conflict or trade-off. The Islamic ethico-legal system 
has a clear scheme of priorities in legislation. Where there is a clear injunction in the 
holy Quran, for example, in the form of prohibition of riba and games of chance, 
these must be observed at all costs. Next in importance are the norms that follow from 
the Sunna or traditions of the holy prophet, and ijma or consensus, in that order. For 
example, the principle of freedom from darar is Sunna and hence, is accorded lower 
priority than prohibition of riba. There may be certain areas however, which are 
“unrestricted” by Shariah. What should be the guiding principle for the regulator in 
establishing a system of priorities in these areas? 
3.9. Maslahah Mursalah (Unrestricted Public Interest) 
The answer to the above may be found in the framework of maslahah mursalah or 
“unrestricted” public interest, which is a valid framework of Islamic legislation. The 
framework is called “unrestricted” public interest on account of its being undefined by 
                                                 
6  See " Mahmoud Amin Al-Gamal (2006)" 
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the established rules of Shariah. Maslahah consists of “considerations which secure a 
benefit or prevent a harm but are, in the mean time, harmonious with the objectives 
(maqasid) of Shariah. These objectives consist of protecting five essential values, 
namely, religion, life, intellect, lineage and property, which have a much wider scope 
and meaning. For instance, protecting the right to live includes protecting the means, 
which facilitate an honorable life, such as, freedom to work and travel. Protection of 
property requires defending the right of ownership. It also means facilitating fair trade 
and lawful exchange of goods and services in the community. Any measure which 
secures these values falls within the scope of maslahah and anything which violates 
them is mafsadah (evil), and preventing the latter is also maslahah. For example, any 
attempt to curb monopolistic tendencies or block the free flow of information in the 
market place is a step to secure a maslahah. Further, an act which implies the 
attaining of a maslahah and the warding off a harm should not be forbidden even if it 
were, from another aspect, to negate a maslahah and to bring about a harm, as long as 
the secured maslahah outweighs the harm that results from the act or the maslahah 
that may be negated in consequence of it. 
Thus, the framework essentially involves a comparison of benefits and costs at a 
macro-level. And needless to say, this principle of ensuring maximum net social 
benefits is clearly accorded a lower priority than principles emanating directly from 
the holy Quran and the Sunna. Of course, this specific norm ensuring maximum net 
social benefits is a valid, and at the same time, a dynamic basis of regulation and 
legislation in the Islamic framework. It is dynamic, because it can meet the challenges 
of ever-changing circumstances facing a Muslim society. The nature and intensity of 
factors affecting social benefits and costs are likely to vary across space, and time.7 
                                                 
7 See "Hussein Hamid Hassan (1994)" 
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4. Characteristics of Islamic Finance and Banking 
4.1. Objection to interest 
In order to understand why there is a demand for specifically Islamic financial 
instruments it is necessary to appreciate Muslim objections to conventional interest or 
Riba. The fact that Riba is explicitly prohibited in the Koran is sufficient justification 
for Muslims to avoid transactions which involve interest. Such avoidance is not only 
based on faith, but also on reason, there is a distinguished tradition in Islamic 
scholarship for using reasoned argument. 
The distinctive implications of interest collection have always been a major moral 
concern. Worries about debtors being exploited through usury were by no means the 
exclusive concern of Muslims. Many Christian theological writers concerned with 
economical and social issues have taken a similar position, although the teaching of 
the medieval saints and scholars seems to have been conveniently, overlooked in the 
present age of moral relativism. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century examined 
the reasons for being opposed to interest and took a much more fundamentalist 
position pointing to biblical teaching. In the New Testament, Luke 6:35 clearly states: 
'lend, hoping for nothing in return'. The Old Testament teaching is spelt out in 
Exodus: 'if you lend money to any of my people with you who is poor, you shall not 
be to him as a creditor, and you shall not exact interest from him.' (22:25) 
Whether all interest or only excessive interest is usury has been much debated by 
Muslim and Christian economists. Modern western economists tend to regard the 
interest charges of commercial banks to their business and personal clients as 
necessary to cover financing costs, but modern Islamic economists interpret the Koran 
literally, and equate all interest with usury. The Koran states that: ' God will deprive 
usury with all blessing, will give increase for deeds of charity.' (Sura 2:276) interest is 
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regarded as unjust and exploitative return. The notion of interest as a reward for 
deferring consumption is rejected, as saving will bring its own reward, without the 
need for additional monetary compensation. Excessive saving may result in 
underconsumption, recession and damage to legitimate trade. In the Koran it is stated 
that: ' God hath permitted trade and forbidden usury.' (Sura 2:275) There are parallels 
between these concerns and the Keynesian stress on maintaining the flow of income 
to minimize the unemployment.  
Islamic economics object to the principle of interest, not merely excessive interest. 
The problem is how to define usury, as stating that it occurs when interest exceeds 
certain predetermined amount is inevitably an arbitrary procedure. Yet this is the case 
of western anti-usury laws, such as those still enforced in France. Such laws relate to 
nominal interest and make no allowance for variable inflation. If inflation falls but 
nominal interest fails to adjust, borrowers will penalized through no fault of their 
own, while savers and lenders will benefit from unjustified windfall gain. 
Islam stresses that all transactions should be just, and Muslims view interest-based 
transactions as inherently unjust. One difficulty is where interest rates are set by either 
central bank or government in order to attain macroeconomic objectives such as 
control of inflation. This affects microeconomic agents such as savers and investors, 
who are then burdened with unwanted political and economic risks as well as their 
own personal finance and business risk. If interest ceases to be an instrument of 
monetary policy, as in Islamic economy, microeconomic agents can focus more 
sharply on their own commercial concerns.8 
 
 
                                                 
8 See " El-Gamal, Mahmoud Amin (2000)" 
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4.2 Sources and Uses of Funds 
The main sources of funds for an Islamic bank would be two forms of deposits-
transactions deposits and investment deposits. Transactions deposits are directly 
related to payments and can be regarded as equivalent to demand deposits in a 
conventional banking system. Although a bank would guarantee the nominal value of 
the deposit, it would pay no return on this type of liability. Investment deposits 
constitute the principal source of funds for banks, and they resemble more closely 
shares in a firm rather than time and saving deposits of the customary sort. The bank 
offering investment deposits would provide no guarantee on their nominal value and 
would not pay a fixed rate of return. Depositors, instead, would be treated as if they 
were shareholders and therefore entitled to a share of the profit, or losses, made by the 
bank.9 The only contractual agreement between the depositor and the bank is the 
proportion in which profits and losses are to be distributed. The share, or distribution, 
parameter has to be agreed on in advance of the transaction between the bank and the 
depositor and cannot be altered during the life of the contract, except by mutual 
consent.10 
The bank can acquire profit-sharing assets via two principle modes of transactions: 
Mudarabah and Musharakah. Under the provisions of the first mode, surplus funds are 
made available to the entrepreneur to be invested in a productive enterprise in return 
for a predetermined share of the profits earned. Financial losses are borne exclusively 
by the lender. The borrower, as such, loses only the time and effort invested in the 
venture. This arrangement, therefore, effectively places human capital on par with 
financial capital. In Musharakah, on the other hand, there is more than a single 
contributor of funds. All parties invest in varying proportions, and the profits (or 
                                                 
9 See " Iqbal, M. and Llewellyn, D.T., (2002)" 
10  See " Siddiqui, M. Nejathullah (1985)" 
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losses) are shared strictly in relation to their respective capital contribution. This 
financing method corresponds to an equity market in which shares can be acquired by 
the public, banks, and even the central bank and the government. Traditionally, 
Mudarabah has been employed in investment projects with short gestation periods and 
in trade and commerce, whereas Musharakah is used in long-term investment 
projects. These two modes have their historical counterparts in farming (Muzar'ah) 
and in orchard keeping (Musaqat), where the harvest is shared between and among the 
partners based on pre-specified shares. Following table is a Synoptic Analysis of 
Islamic Modes of Financing: 
 
Table 2: Profit-and-Loss (PLS) Modes of Islamic Financing: 
 
TYPE DESCRIPTION COMMENTS 
PLS Modes Profit-and-loss-sharing modes At the core of Islamic banking 
Mudaraba  
Trustee finance contract 
Under this kind of contract, the bank provides 
the entire capital needed for financing a project, 
while the entrepreneur offers his labor and 
expertise. The profits (or losses) from the project 
are shared between the bank and the 
entrepreneur at a certain fixed ratio. Financial 
losses are borne exclusively by the bank. The 
liability of the entrepreneur is limited only to his 
time and efforts. However, if the negligence or 
mismanagement of the entrepreneur can be 
proven he may be held responsible for the 
financial losses incurred.  
 
Mudaraba is usually employed in investment 
projects with short gestation periods and in trade 
and commerce.  
 
It affects both assets and liabilities sides of 
banks balance sheet. On the liabilities side, the 
contract between the bank and depositors is 
known as unrestricted Mudaraba because 
depositors agree that their funds be used by the 
bank, at its discretion to finance an open-ended 
list of profitable investment and expect to share 
with the bank the overall profits accruing to the 
bank's business. On the assets side, the contract 
between the bank and the agent-entrepreneur is 
known as restricted Mudaraba because the bank 
agrees to finance a specific project carried out by 
a specific agent-entrepreneur and to share the 
relative profits according to a certain percentage.
 
Three conditions need to be met: 
1. The bank should not reduce credit risk 
by requesting collateral to this purpose: it 
bears entirely and exclusively the 
financial risk. Collateral may be 
requested to help reduce moral hazard, 
for example, to prevent the entrepreneur 
from vanishing. 
 
2. The rate of profit has to be determined 
strictly as a percentage and not as a lump 
sum. 
 
3. The entrepreneur has the absolute 
freedom to manage the business. 
 
The bank is entitled to receive from the 
entrepreneur the principal of the loan at 
the end of the period stipulated in the 
contract only if a surplus exists. If the 
enterprise books show a loss, this will 
not constitute default on the part of the 
entrepreneur, except for negligence or 
mismanagement. 
Musharaka  Equity participation contract
The bank is not the sole provider of funds to 
 
Banks can exercise the voting rights 
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finance a project. Two or more partners 
contribute to the joint capital of an investment. 
 
Profits (and losses) are shared strictly in relation 
to the respective capital contributions. 
 
This kind of contract is usually employed to 
finance long-term investment projects.
corresponding to their share of the firm's 
equity capital. Their representatives can 
sit on the firm's board of directors. 
 
All parties invest in varying proportions, 
and have the right to participate in the 
management of the enterprise. 
Muzar'ah This is the traditional counterpart of the 
Mudaraba contract in farming. 
The harvest is shared between the bank and the 
entrepreneur. The bank may provide funds or 
land. 
 
Musaqat This is the traditional counterpart of the 
Musharaka contract in orchard keeping. 
The harvest is shared among the partners based 
on their respective contributions.
 
Direct 
investment 
This represents the same concept as in 
conventional banking. The bank cannot invest in 
the production of goods and services which 
contradict the value pattern of Islam, such as 
gambling. 
Banks can exercise the voting rights 
corresponding to their share of the firm's 
equity capital. Their representatives can 
sit on the firm's board of directors. 
 
In transactions where profit sharing is not applicable, other modes of financing can be 
employed, which include the following. 
 
Table 3: Non-PLS Modes of Islamic Financing 
TYPE DESCRIPTION COMMENT 
Non-PLS 
mode 
Non-profit-and-loss-sharing modes  They are used in cases where PLS modes 
cannot be implemented, for example, in 
cases of small-scale borrowers or for 
consumption loans. 
Qard al- 
Hasanah 
Beneficence loans 
These are zero-return loans that the Qur'an 
exhorts Muslims to make to "those who need 
them." Banks are allowed to charge the 
borrowers a service fee to cover the 
administrative expenses of handling the loan, 
provided that the fee is not related to the amount 
or maturity of the loan. 
 
Bai' 
Muajjal 
Deferred payment sales  
The seller can sell a product on the basis of a 
deferred payment in installments or in a lump 
sum payment. The price of the product is agreed 
upon between the buyer and the seller at the time 
of the sale and cannot include any charge for 
deferring payments. 
Contrary to contracts based on the PLS 
principle, modes such as markup, 
leasing, and lease purchase have a 
predetermined and fixed rate of return 
and are associated with collateral.  
In fact, banks add a certain percentage to 
the purchase price and/or additional costs 
associated with these transactions as a 
profit margin, and the purchased assets 
serve as a guarantee. Moreover, banks 
may require the client to offer collateral. 
Bai' Salaf Purchase with deferred delivery 
The buyer pays the seller the full negotiated 
price of a product that the seller promises to 
deliver at a future date. This mode only applies 
to products whose quality and quantity can be 
These instruments can be considered to 
be more closely associated with risk 
aversion and they do not substantially 
differ from those used in a conventional 
banking system, other than in their 
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fully specified at the time the contract is made. 
Usually, it applies to agricultural or 
manufactured products. 
terminology and in some legal 
technicalities. 
  
They are considered to conform to 
Islamic principles because the rate of 
return is meant to be tied to each 
transaction, rather than to a time 
dimension. However, some Muslim 
scholars advocate a stricter utilization of 
such modes.  
Ijara 
Ijara wa 
Iqtina 
Leasing 
Lease purchase 
A party leases a particular product for a specific 
sum and a specific period of time. In the case of 
a lease-purchase, cash payment includes a 
portion that goes toward the final purchase and 
transfer of ownership of the product. 
 
Murabaha Mark-up  
The seller informs the buyer of his cost of 
acquiring or producing a specified product; then 
the profit margin (or mark-up) is negotiated 
between the buyer and the seller. The total cost 
is usually paid in installments.  
 
Jo'alah Service Charge 
A party undertakes to pay another party a 
specified amount of money as a fee for rendering 
a specified service in accordance to the terms of 
the contract stipulated between the two parties. 
This mode usually applies to transactions such as 
consultations and professional services, fund 
placements, and trust services. 
 
Sources: Kazarian, 1993; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1987. 
 
The above list is by no means exhaustive. Under Islamic law the freedom of contracts 
provides the parties with a flexibility that makes possible a virtually open-ended 
variety of forms of financial transactions and instruments. There is nothing to 
constrain the system from creating any contractual form so long as the contract does 
not include interest and both parties are fully informed of the details of the contract. 
Here, it can be useful to compare Islamic and Conventional Banking as table 4 
provides a synoptic comparison between Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 4: A Comparison between Islamic and Conventional Banking 
Features Islamic Banking Conventional Banking 
Guarantee of the capital 
value of Demand deposits 
Investment deposits 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Rate of return on deposits Uncertain, not guaranteed for 
investment deposits. Demand 
deposits are never 
remunerated. 
Certain and guaranteed. 
Mechanism to regulate 
final returns on deposits 
Depending on bank 
Performance/ profits from 
investment. 
 
Irrespective of bank 
performance/ profits 
from investment. 
 
Applicability of Profit-
and-loss (PLS) principle 
Yes No 
Use of Islamic modes of 
Financing : 
PLS and non-PLS modes 
 
Yes 
 
Non-applicable 
Use of discretion by banks 
with regard to collateral 
Generally not allowed to 
reduce credit risk in PLS 
modes. By way of exception, 
may be allowed to lessen 
moral hazard in PLS modes. 
Allowed in non-PLS modes. 
Yes, always 
Source:  IMF 
Based on the above, the following points are worthy of note:11 
Owing to the use of profit-and-loss-sharing arrangements, Islamic banks are better 
poised than conventional banks to absorb external shocks. In the event of operational 
losses, unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks have the ability to reduce the 
nominal value of investment deposits, that is, reduce the nominal value of a portion of 
their liabilities. As a result, solvency risks that may arise from an asset-liability 
mismatch are typically lower in Islamic banks than in conventional banks. 
Islamic banks show an operational similarity with conventional investment 
companies, including mutual funds owing to the fact that they do not guarantee either 
the capital value of or the return on investment deposits and that they basically pool 
depositors' funds to provide depositors with professional investment management. 
                                                 
11 See " Fredrick Vernon Iffert (1998)" 
18 
 
There is, however, a fundamental conceptual difference between the two that also 
needs to be recognized. It lies in the fact that investment companies sell their capital 
to the public, while Islamic banks accept deposits from the public. This implies that 
shareholders of an investment company own a proportionate part of the companies 
equity capital and are entitled to a number of rights, including receiving a regular flow 
of information on developments of the companies business and exerting voting rights 
corresponding to their shares on important matters, such as changes in investment 
policy Hence, they are in a position to take informed investment decisions, monitor 
the company's performance, and influence strategic decisions. By contrast, 
(investment) depositors in an Islamic bank are only entitled to share the bank's net 
profit (or loss) according to the PLS ratio stipulated in their contracts. Investment 
deposits cannot be withdrawn at any time, but only on maturity and, in the best case, 
at par value. Moreover, depositors have no voting rights because they do not own any 
portion of the bank's equity capital.  
4.3. Issues in the interest-free finance and banking 
The replacement of an interest-based banking system by an alternative system that 
relies primarily on profit-sharing arrangements raises a number of fundamental 
theoretical and practical questions, among the most important of these are: First, how 
will an Islamic banking system function? Second, what would be the effects of 
adopting such a system on the economy and, in particular, on macroeconomic 
variables like savings and investment? And third, what role, if any, would monetary 
policy play in the Islamic system? 
Research on these types of questions is still in its very early stages. Nevertheless, in 
recent years there have been a number of studies that have attempted to conceptualize 
the basic ideas underlying Islamic banking, as well as the likely consequences that 
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would follow from the institution of this system. Taking the view that the reliance on 
profit-sharing arrangements makes the Islamic system akin to an equity-based system, 
relatively straightforward theoretical models have been developed analyzing the 
workings of the system.12 In these models, depositors are treated as shareholders (as 
in a mutual fund or investment trust, e.g.) and banks provide no guarantee on the rate 
of return or the nominal value of shares. Symmetrically, banks themselves become 
partners with the borrowers and accordingly share in the returns obtained from the 
borrowed funds.13 An interesting result that emerges from such models is that the 
Islamic system may be better suited to adjust to shocks that can lead to banking crises 
than an interest-based banking system. In an equity-based system, shocks to the asset 
positions of banks are immediately absorbed by changes in the nominal value of 
shares (deposits) held by the public in banks. 
Therefore, the real values of assets and liabilities would be equal at all points in time. 
In the conventional banking system, since the nominal value of deposits is guaranteed 
by the bank, an adverse shock to assets of the bank can create a divergence between 
real assets and real liabilities-leading possibly to negative net worth for the bank-and 
it is not clear how the disequilibrium would be corrected and how long the process of 
adjustment would take.14 
The elimination of a risk-free asset with a positive predetermined return is expected to 
have significant consequences for savings, investment, financial development, and so 
forth, as well as for the conduct of monetary policy. For example, there is a 
presumption that the removal of a fixed interest rate increases uncertainty, which in 
turn would reduce savings and make lenders worse off. However, this will depend on 
the behavior of financial rates of return in the economy. Serious issues also arise in 
                                                 
12 See " Siddiqui, M. Nejathullah (1983)" 
13 See "Al-Omar, Fouad and Mohammed Abdel Haq (1996)" 
14 See "Haron, Sudin (1996)" 
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the area of investment as the adoption of a profit-sharing arrangement between lender, 
that is, the bank, and investor may raise monitoring costs and discourage investment. 
To avoid this adverse effect and moral hazard issues that arise when the lender and 
investor have different information on the profits from the investment requires the 
implementation of a legal and institutional framework that facilitates appropriate 
contracts. The form of these contracts, and the mechanism for enforcing them, still 
need to be spelled out. Insofar as monetary policy is concerned, the central bank 
would lose the ability to directly set financial rates of return in an Islamic banking 
system. However, theoretical work has shown that indirect methods through control 
of credit extended by banks, reserve requirement changes, and varying of profit-
sharing ratios can achieve results for monetary policy similar to those in a 
conventional interest-based economy.15 
In summary, while there have been significant advances in the development of the 
theoretical foundations of Islamic banking and finance, many important issues are as 
yet unresolved. For example, the role and conduct of fiscal policy, and particularly the 
financing of fiscal deficits, is as yet undefined. Nor has there been much attention 
paid to exchange rate and trade policies and to foreign debt questions. It is clear that 
even if countries fully reorient their economies along Islamic concepts, the fact that 
these countries must coexist with non-Islamic countries raises a variety of issues that 
have a significant bearing on foreign economic relations. 
5. Future Challenges for Islamic Finance and Banking 
5.1. Islamic liquidity management 
Islamic banks investing in long-term assets are still faced with a problem in that most 
of their deposit liabilities are very short-term leading to a massive liquidity problem. 
                                                 
15  See "Al-Harran, S.A.S. (1993)" 
21 
 
Liquidity management tools that are both flexible and undeniably Shari'ah compliant 
are lacking.16 Although Sukuks(Islamic Bonds) can be traded, most of them are held 
to maturity.  
It is inevitable that competition between various conventional banks and Islamic ones 
has led to segmentation and prevented a really substantial market developing leading 
to a spiraling vortex of liquidity. For things to change there will need to be more co-
operation amongst Islamic banks and between them and their conventional 
counterparties.  
In addition to the lack of long-term assets to invest in and get out of, Islamic banks 
face another serious problem in balance sheet management: the lack of an Islamic 
inter-bank market. Because Islamic banks unlike conventional banks cannot borrow at 
interest to meet unexpected withdrawals from their depositors, it is difficult for them 
to run mismatched asset and liability portfolios. And this is aside from the interest rate 
risk they run when they invest long at fixed rate and have their liabilities re-price 
frequently. The way banks have most commonly solved this problem is to have more 
liquid assets than would be in the case of conventional banks and these are placed 
with commodity Murabahas on the understanding that they can get liquidity when 
required through early cancellations at an explicit or hidden cost.17 There are a few 
Islamic liquidity vehicles but these are fairly small and could not withstand a several 
hundred dollar injection or withdrawal. There needs to be a market-wide central 
solution that allows institutions to park funds between medium to long term 
investments. We need a solution that involves high quality, standardization, gets away 
from bilateral Murabaha investments by the investor with all the problems of break 
clauses, listing and price transparency and are able to transact in substantial size. 
                                                 
16 See " Karimi, Abdul Jabbar (2005)" 
17 See " Saiful Azhar Rosly.(2005)" 
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Several initiatives are in hand and there are likely to be some announcements by the 
end of the year. 
In summary, whilst there have been a number of Islamic Sukuks (Islamic Bonds) 
issued recently; most of the paper is bought to hold rather than trade. Thus liquidity is 
a problem both for on sale and price determination and mark to market is difficult. 
This is a result of a combination of two factors. There is a shortage of quality paper 
issued into the market and also the view in some quarters that the trading of debt is 
not Shariah compliant.  
In terms of Asset / Liability Management there is a hedging problem for institutions 
that lend long term at fixed yield through Ijaras and finance through short term and 
therefore variable yield accounts. There is thus a pressing need for Islamic derivatives 
to address this gap problem. But most derivatives are deemed to be Haram or not 
Shariah compliant on the grounds of being gambling. Perhaps "Financial Takaful 
(insurance)" would be a better banner to address this problem and a number of 
institutions believe they have much needed solutions to this problem. 
There is also a problem in terms of the lack of Islamically compliant short-term 
liquidity instruments. The Sukuks, even if they were traded and liquid, are medium to 
long term. And the current shortage of credit lines to some Middle Eastern institutions 
has led to an increase in short term cash holdings but the lack of suitable instruments 
creates a liquidity trap. There needs to be a truly global-sized liquid inter-bank market 
where institutions can park their liquidity reserves.18 
5.2. Islamic Financial risk management 
From the exhaustive discussion on the Islamic financial ethics it is clear that some 
efficiency notions, such as, informational and pricing efficiency are clearly in 
                                                 
18 See " Mohammed Obaidullah (2002)" 
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conformity with the Islamic and ethical notions relating to adequacy and accuracy of 
information and fair pricing. As regards full-insurance efficiency or operational 
efficiency, these can be justified in the Islamic ethical framework in terms of their 
maslahah for the people at large.19 What then is the maslahah underlying the 
derivative contracts?  
Risk management products allow the market participants at a micro-level to avoid 
undesirable risks. These products make it possible to transfer risks to other 
participants who would like to bear them. Risk management products or derivatives 
have proliferated over the last two decades in response to large-scale volatility 
witnessed in global markets in commodities, currencies, stocks and bonds. The 
products can often be quite complex, engineered specifically to meet the risk 
management requirements of a particular market participant. At a basic level, 
however, these products can be discussed in the category of options and forward 
contracts. Often the more complex products include features of these basic contracts. 
It is quite clear that options and futures (and forwards) do provide certain benefits to 
market participants exposed to certain kinds of risky situations. And given the 
complexity of modern business requiring advance planning, and the many risks 
arising out of fluctuations in prices and rates in markets for commodities, currencies, 
and other financial assets, the maslahah seems to be real and substantial. 
However, as discussed earlier in Islamic financial ethics, in forming the basis of 
legislation, maslahah such as above is to be accorded a lower priority than the Quran, 
or the Sunnah, or Ijma. Among the various norms of ethics, the ones that are the most 
important are freedom from riba, gharar and qimar or maysir. Prohibition of riba, 
gharar and qimar are central to Islamic law of contracts in view of the strong Quranic 
                                                 
19  See " Al-Jahri and Munawar Iqbal (2001)" 
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condemnation of these elements. If the so-called risk management products are to be 
admissible in the Islamic framework, they would have to be free from these 
elements.20 Clearly, fulfilling certain social needs or providing certain maslahah does 
not; by itself constitute a strong enough ground for permissive legislation.  
The most significant objection against futures and options is that these are invariably 
settled in price differences only and never result in actual delivery of the object of 
exchange. How does one use derivatives for gambling, or speculation of a variety akin 
to a game of chance?   
Let us consider the case of simple options, such as, a call option. A call option enables 
the buyer to magnify his returns if his expectations materialize. In the game the buyer 
and seller must have diametrically opposite expectations. The possibility of risk and 
returns are magnified, the gains of the buyer being equal to the losses of the seller and 
vice versa. Thus, the purchase and sale of options is a risky zero-sum game. It can be 
demonstrated how a buyer or seller in a forward or future can speculate on the 
direction of prices with no intention of giving or taking delivery of the object of 
exchange. Invariably, the transactions are reversed on or before the date of maturity 
and the game boils down to playing in price differences. The possibility of such gains 
encourages economic units to speculate on the future direction of the price of the 
underlying asset. Since prices of such assets fluctuate randomly, gains and losses are 
random too and the game is reduced to a game of chance. There is a vast body of 
literature on the predictability of stock prices, currency exchange rates etc. Prices and 
rates are volatile and remain unpredictable at least for the large majority of market 
participants. Needless to say, any attempt to speculate in the hope of the theoretically 
infinite gains is, in all likelihood, a game of chance for such participants. While the 
                                                 
20  See " Mushtaq Ahmad (1983)" 
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gains, if they materialize, are in the nature of maysir or unearned gains, the possibility 
of equally massive losses do indicate a possibility of default by the loser and hence, 
gharar.21 
The presence of large scale speculation is tolerated in conventional financial markets 
on the grounds of providing liquidity and ensuring vibrant and active markets. The 
speculators are seen to provide for the “other” end of the transaction whenever a 
hedger wants to hedge. Their presence is seen to improve operational efficiency of the 
market by bringing down transaction costs. However, in the Islamic framework, the 
provision of hedging facility is hardly an adequate rationale for tolerating qimar and 
maysir. The Shariah does not disapprove of hedging, since it brings in some 
maslahah. It is the zero-sum nature of the game that the Shariah finds objectionable, 
as in it, lay the roots of social disharmony and discord. Clearly, solutions to risk 
management problem need to be found elsewhere, and not through derivatives 
trading. Even from a conventional efficiency point of view, large-scale speculation 
may indeed threaten the stability and allocational efficiency of the system, though this 
line of argument may not easily find favor due to lack of empirical academic support. 
5.3. Other Challenges 
This phenomenal rate of growth is likely to be affected by a number of challenges: 
• Shortage of experts in Islamic banking: The supply of trained or 
experienced bankers has lagged behind the expansion of Islamic 
banking. The training needs affect not only Arab domestic banks, 
both Islamic and non-Islamic, but foreign banks as well.  
                                                 
21  See " Ariff, Mohamed, Mannan, M.A. (1990) 
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• Absence of accounting (and auditing) standards pertinent to Islamic 
banks: Uncertainty in accounting principles involves revenue 
realization, disclosures of accounting information, accounting bases, 
valuation, revenue and expense matching, among others. Thus, the 
results of Islamic banking schemes may not be adequately defined, 
particularly profit and loss shares attributed to depositors. The need is 
to satisfy local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAPs), 
IFRS, and financial and prudential regulations, etc.  
• Lack of uniform standards of credit analysis: Islamic banks have no 
appropriate standard of credit analysis. Similarly, there is a 
widespread training need involving related aspects such as financial 
feasibility studies, monitoring of ventures and portfolio evaluation.  
• Differences with central banks: Islamic banks have been established as 
separate legal entities; therefore, their relationships with central banks 
and/or other commercial banks are uncertain. Problems may be 
further aggravated when an Islamic bank is established in a non-
Muslim nation, and is subject to that nation's rules and requirements.  
• Differences within domestic banks, foreign banks, and Islamic banks: 
It appears that domestic banks and foreign banks will experience 
continuing difficulty in adopting Islamic banking practices until they 
can become more confident of the results of investing ventures.  
• Instruments that meet the demand of specific investment 
requirements: One of the biggest challenges facing institutions is the 
provision of short-term investment instruments. Several institutions 
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have tried to develop high quality short-term instruments, but have 
been hampered by their ability to generate assets, by their credit 
ratings, and by liquidity.  
• The product development needs to be enhanced and moreover 
consistency is required in product structure.  
• Improvement of corporate governance and risk management practice.  
• Revision of usual tax regimes to meet the needs of Islamic products 
and create a level playing field with conventional products.  
To fulfill this potential, the pressure remains on Islamic financial institutions to move 
toward additional and more sophisticated offerings for consumers who demand 
Shariah-compliant products. These consumers are making it increasingly clear that 
returns, service, and convenience of these offerings are just as critical as Shariah 
compliance. 
Indeed, this is a clear measure of the progress the industry has made in a matter of 
years - no longer is there a perception that you should be prepared 'to pay extra' for 
Shariah-compliant products. 
Historically, Shariah compliance was the primary issue among investors. The debate 
now encompasses additional issues such as quality of return, transparency of 
disclosure and excellence of customer service. 
6. Conclusion 
In the recent decade, the Islamic financial system has experienced remarkable growth 
and transformation, demonstrating its potential as a competitive form of financial 
intermediation. Today, Islamic finance represents a multi-billion dollar industry with 
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a comprehensive range of products and services, serving a broad spectrum of 
consumers and businesses that extends beyond the Muslim world.  
In developing the Islamic financial system, it is important to focus on the appropriate 
pre-requisites that will facilitate its efficient evolution. Fundamental to this is the 
development of the institutions, the markets, the range of financial products and 
services and having in place the accounting, legal, regulatory, supervisory and shariah 
frameworks, as well as, for the monetary authority to have the capacity to manage its 
financial policies within this context.  
With the development of these respective components having made significant 
progress, we are now seeing the Islamic financial services industry enter a new phase 
of development. Following increased liberalisation, the progress in the development 
of the international financial architecture for Islamic finance and the increased 
innovation resulting in the development of new products and services, the 
international dimension of Islamic finance is becoming increasingly more significant.  
Islamic financial institutions are now also venturing their operations beyond their 
domestic borders. Islamic-based papers are also being issued in international financial 
markets, generating significant interest from global investors. The international 
financial architecture for the development of Islamic finance has also been 
strengthened with the establishment of the international boards to set the accounting 
and prudential standards. These developments have cumulatively evolved the Islamic 
financial system to increasingly become an integral component of the international 
financial system.  
In Islamic banking, the management of risks becomes more challenging due to its 
peculiar risk characteristics and the requirement for compliance to Shariah principles. 
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The identification of usual risk factors have to be complemented with consideration of 
the other dimensions of risks that are inherent in the Islamic financial transactions. 
The risk management infrastructure in Islamic financial institutions needs to identify, 
unbundle, measure, control and monitor all the specific risks in the Islamic financial 
transactions and instruments.  
Another facet to risk management is the need for the Islamic banking industry to 
develop a derivatives market. In the current increasingly uncertain global financial 
environment, investors need to be in a position to mitigate and manage these 
emerging new risks. Islamic banking institutions, in particular, have to large extent 
long-term assets which include long-term Islamic housing mortgages and Islamic 
financial instruments, that are funded by short-term deposits, thus giving rise to a 
maturity mismatch between the assets and liabilities. There is therefore a need for the 
development of a broader range of Islamic financial market instruments to provide the 
industry with effective risk mitigating instruments.  
In addition to the derivatives market, the Islamic financial system also needs deeper 
and more efficient money and capital markets to facilitate sound asset and liability, 
and liquidity management by Islamic financial institutions.  
Notwithstanding the significant progress made so far, there are still outstanding issues 
confronting the Islamic financial system today, particularly the different 
interpretations of the Shariah injunctions. Internationally, there continue to be debates 
among Shariah scholars on the compliance to the Shariah principles.  
The development of a vibrant Islamic banking sector cannot be achieved without the 
support of appropriate human capital development. Underpinning the success of 
Islamic banking system is the strengthening of research and intellectual capacity in 
30 
 
the sphere of finance and Shariah. The Islamic banking industry needs to be equipped 
with a new breed of innovators, risk managers, regulators and supervisors who have 
the right blend of knowledge of finance and the understanding of the Shariah.  
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Appendix:  Islamic Financial System in Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
 
Briefly, the process of Islamization of the banking system in Iran has gone through 
three distinct phases. In the first phase (1979-82), the banking system was 
nationalized, restructured, and reorganized in order to remove the weaknesses of the 
inherited system. External and internal developments in this phase did not allow the 
policymakers to develop a coherent plan for Islamization of the banking system, 
although various piecemeal attempts were made toward this objective.  
The second phase began in 1982 and lasted until 1986. In this phase a legislative and 
administrative quantum leap was made in adopting and implementing a clearly 
articulated model of Islamic banking.  The Law for Riba-Free Banking was passed in 
August 1983, giving a very short deadline of 1 year to the banks to convert their 
deposits in line with Islamic law and their total operations within 3 years from the 
date of the passage of the law. During this phase the central bank was implicitly 
envisioned as a quasi-independent economic institution similar to that in most 
Western banking systems, with a considerable degree of autonomy from the rest of 
the government. As in other countries, the central bank exercised extensive control 
over the operation of individual banks.  
The third and current phase, which began in 1986, defines a role for the banking 
system different from the earlier phases, in that the system is now expected to be an 
integral part of the Islamic government and, thus, a direct instrument of its policies. 
This development is a direct result of the political debate within Iran surrounding the 
proper role of the government in an Islamic economy.  
Much of the trend in Islamic banking in Iran has been influenced by factors that have 
their roots in the pre-Revolutionary economic structure, as well as post revolutionary 
external and internal political developments. The post revolution economy had 
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inherited a host of difficult economic problems. Before the revolution, the Iranian 
economy had become highly dependent on oil revenues as well as on importation of 
raw materials, intermediate goods, and food. The industrial sector was organized 
without due attention paid to efficiency or comparative advantage and with very weak 
forward and backward linkages to the rest of the economy. The agriculture sector, 
which was producing surplus commodities up until the late 1960s, began to contract, 
and there was a massive migration of farmers into the cities. Poor economic planning, 
influx of enormous oil revenues, and rapid increase in government expenditures 
stimulated the growth of a private sector enjoying import controls, exclusive licenses, 
low-interest loans, and low taxes on profits. The result of these policies was that at the 
time of the revolution Iran had a private sector that had a perception of its role in the 
economy quite different from that envisioned by the Islamic leadership of the country. 
The revolution brought with it a host of economic problems including, inter alia, 
massive capital flight, which almost led to the collapse of the banking and financial 
system. The problems began to multiply for the economy at a rapid pace as the 
revolution took root. 
The economy, already vulnerable to internal and external shocks, faced the freezing of 
foreign assets, economic sanctions, interruptions in production. The constitution of 
the Islamic Republic specified objectives for the economy to be pursued-such as 
income redistribution, self-sufficiency in production, strengthening of the agriculture 
sector, creation of an active cooperative sector in the economy, and reduced reliance 
on oil revenues-all of which required fundamental restructuring of the society's 
economic behavior and institutions. The political objective of nonreliance on external 
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financial resources inevitably meant that the banking system would have to be relied 
on to play a role far broader than that of pure intermediation.22 
 
Table 5: Iran: Modes of Permissible Transactions Corresponding to Types Of 
Economic Activity 
 
Permissible Mode Type of Activity 
Musharakah, lease-purchase, Salaf transactions, install-  
ment sales, direct investment, Muzara'ah, Musaqat,  
and Jo'alah  
Production  
(industrial, mining,  
agricultural)  
Mudarabah, Musharakah, Jo'alah  Commercial  
Lease-purchase, installment sales, Jo'alah  Service  
Lease-purchase, installment, Qard al-Hasanah, Jo'alah  Housing  
Installment sales, Qard al-Hasanah  Personal consumption  
SOURCE: Based on information supplied by Bank Marakazi (Central Bank of Iran).  
 
 
Table 5 shows the various modes that facilitate financing of transactions in each line 
of economic activity. However, this table is only suggestive in that a bank can finance 
a given economic project with any, or a combination, of the permissible modes. For 
example, the Bank of Industries and Mines, which is an investment bank, breaks 
down the total financing requirements of a particular project into their various 
components in accordance with the size of each required amount of financing and 
with the gestation period. The component is then matched with a particular mode of 
financing. The objective is to reduce the burden of financing on the profits of the firm. 
For instance, the working capital requirement of the project may be financed with 
Salaf, machinery with lease-purchase, and production costs with Musharakah. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 See " Mohsin S. Khan; Abbas Mirakhor " 
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Table 6: Asset side of banking system in Iran. 
 
Numbers in billion I.R. Rial, 2006 / 2007 
Facilities Commercial Banks 
Specialized 
Banks 
Private Banks 
and Credit 
institutions 
Total Percent
Installment sale 291803.8 58751.3 11616.5 362171.6 34.1 
Housing 111935.0 146895.7 48801.0 307631.7 29.0 
Civil Partnership 66743.2 18500.6 40558.1 125801.9 11.8 
Mudaraba 59425.2 2591.2 28610.5 90626.9 8.5 
Salaf 49872.2 7011.7 305.3 57189.1 5.4 
Qad al Hasanah 33323.3 626.9 497.3 40082.5 3.8 
Leasse purchase 7101.7 1426.0 14755.0 23282.7 2.2 
Legal Partnership 12789.5 6023.1 2583.4 21396.0 2.0 
Joalah 17164.1 1372.4 2230.8 20767.3 1.9 
Direct investment 9565.0 156.2 1761.8 11.483.0 1.1 
Other 234.1 78.2 1688.7 2001.0 0.3 
Total 659967.1 249068.3 153408.3 1062433.7 100.0
Source: Iran Economics Magazine 
 
As it can be seen clearly from table 6, among all facilities, Installment sale and 
housing with 34.1 and 29 percent has the biggest share, respectively and Qard al 
Hasanah has the lowest share. The most part of Qard al Hasanah facility was given by 
commercial banks. In contrast, for private banks and credit institution Qard Al 
Hasanah with 497.3 billion Rials, after Salaf, is the lowest facilities among the others.   
 
